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CAN COLLYER AND GARDNER-DENVER -CO-EXIST?
A POSTSCRIPT
JULIUS G. GETMANf
In the fall issue of this journal I argued that the Labor Board's
Collyer doctrine,' under which the Board refuses to hear cases which
could be submitted to arbitration, constitutes unwarranted deference
to a tribunal not well equipped to deal with statutory claims under the
National Labor Relations Act.' My argument assumed that adoption of
the Collyer doctrine was within the Board's power. Since the article
appeared the United States Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.8 has dealt with the relationship between arbitration and
statutory claims under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
Court's opinion, written, by Justice Powell, substantially undercuts the
arguments which have been advanced on behalf of the Collyer doctrine
and it raises the question whether the doctrine constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
The Court in Gardner-Denver held unanimously that an employee
who alleged that his discharge was racially motivated was entitled to
pursue his claim under title VII even though it had already been rejected
by an arbitrator in a grievance proceeding brought by the union.' Al-
though the case deals with title VII rather than the NLRA, and the
weight to be given to an already rendered award rather than with the
question of deferral, it is difficult to see how the Gardner opinion
and the Collyer doctrine can co-exist.
The Collyer doctrine rests in part upon the Board's desire to conform
with the national policy of encouraging the use of arbitration to settle
labor disputes.6 The Gardner-Denver opinion makes clear, however,
that this policy does not extend so far as to compel a preference for
arbitration in the place of a statutorily created forum. As the Court stated:
' Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. The doctrine was first stated in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150,
77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (Aug. 20, 1971).
2. The National Labor Relations Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970)
[hereinafter referred to as NLRA] ; Getman, Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Mis-
placed Modesty?, 49 IND. L.J. 57 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Getman].
3. 42 U.S.L.W. 4214 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974).
4. Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
5. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4221.
6. See, e.g., United Steel Workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960).
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The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory
rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a
result of the same, factual occurence. And certainly no incon-
sistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in
their respectively appropriate forums.7
Moreover, the Court in Gardner-Denver recognizes that arbitration
is a poor forum for vindication of statutory rights. The Court wrote:
Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution
of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively in-
appropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by
Title VII. This conclusion rests first on the special role of the
arbitrator, whose task is to effectuate the intent of the parties
rather than the requirements of enacted legislation. Where the
collective-bargaining agreement conflicts with Title VII, the
arbitration must follow the agreement. . . . But other facts
may still render arbitral processes comparatively inferior to
judicial processes in the protection of Title VII rights. Among
these is the fact that the specialized competence of arbitrators
pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land.'
The Court also pointed out that the fact-finding process in arbitration
"usually is not equivalent to judicial fact-finding."9
In Gardner-Denver the Court also summarily rejected the argument
that resorting to arbitration or the promise to arbitrate constitutes a
waiver of the right to pursue the statutory remedy, a claim which has
been made in defense of the Collyer doctrine." The Court stated,
"[b] oth rights have legally independent origins and are equally available
to the aggreived employee."" Indeed, the Court suggests that the union
could not properly waive the statutory forum on behalf of the employee
even if it chose to do so. Relatedly, the Court also refused to adopt
a rule requiring federal courts to defer to already issued arbitration
awards in certain defined circumstances. The result of such a rule would be
to deprive the petitioner of his statutory right to attempt
7. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4218.
8. Id. at 4220.
9. Id.
The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of
evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such
as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath,
are often severely limited or unavailable.
Id.
10. See Schatzki, A Response to Professor Getman, 49 INI. L.J. 76 (1973).
11. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4219.
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to establish his claim in a federal court...
Furthermore, we have long recognized that "the choice of
forums inevitably affects the scope of the substantive right to
be vindicated."' 2
The reasoning in Gardner-Denver is applicable to claims arising
under the NLRA. The distinction drawn by the Court between statu-
torily created rights and forums and contractually created rights and
forums is identical in the two situations. The procedural weaknesses in
arbitration are the same under the NLRA as under title VII, as are
the limits on the arbitrator's jurisdiction and competence. 8  In fact,
the authority cited by the Court for the limited nature of the arbitrator's
authority includes articles addressed mainly to the arbitrator's role in
enforcing rights under the NLRA."4 Thus, there is no more reason
to imply a waiver of the statutory forum in NLRA cases than in those
arising under title VII. The opinion itself recognizes the basic simi-
larity of the two situatons:
The resulting scheme is somewhat analogous to the procedure
under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, where dis-
puted transactions may implicate both contractual and statutory
rights.' -5
It could be argued that the Gardner-Denver opinion represents a
special rule limited to allegatiors of racial discrimination. It may be that
in such cases the arbitration process is particularly suspect as a technique
for the vindication of individual rights.'" However, the opinion does
not stress this element. Its emphasis is on the role of the courts in the
statutory scheme set up for the enforcement of title VII rights. This
role, while important, is less significant than the role assigned to the
Board in enforcing rights under the NLRA.'
The Gardner-Denver case involves the weight to be given to an
already issued award, while the Collyer doctrine requires the Board to
defer in the first instance subject to the possibility of assuming juris-
diction at a later time to protect statutory rights. But the Collyer doctrine
is premised upon the willingness of the Board to give considerable weight
12. Id. at 4220.
13. See Getman, supra note 2, at 57-63.
14. See, e.g., 42 U.S.L.W. at 4219 n.16. There the Court cites Meltzer, Rumina-
tions About Ideology, Law, and Arbitrations, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 545 (1967).
15. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4218.
16. See Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination,
118 U. PA. L. REv. 40, 46-52 (1969).
17. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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to the arbitrator's award." The Court refused to require this practice
in title VII cases, and held that the district court should consider the
case de novo. It based its conclusion on the grounds that
Congress . . . thought it necessary to provide a judicial
forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment
claims. It is the duty of courts to assume the full availability of
this forum. 9
The Collyer doctrine is basically inconsistent with the full availa-
bility of the statutory forum. Indeed, its purpose is to have as many
casles as possible finally decided by another forum. If the Board were
to respond to the Gardner-Denver decision by not giving weight to
arbitration awards once issued, it would undercut its own stated purpose
and merely multiply the amount of litigation arising out of a single claim.
The Gardner-Denver decision should lead the Board to abandon
the Collyer doctrine. If the Board does not do so, the Courts of Appeals
should no longer treat Collyer as involving issues totally within the Board's
discretion. The Supreme Court has now enunciated a national policy
favoring the effectuation of statutory rights through the statutorily
created agencies. The Collyer doctrine is fundamentally inconsistent
with that policy.
18. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, -, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1934
(Aug. 20, 1971).
19. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4221 n.21.
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